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For more than two centuries, the Fourth Amendment1 has stood as a
critical bulwark against the ability of the state to interfere in the lives and
the property rights of ordinary citizens. At its most basic level, it protects
the people from searches or seizures that are born out of hunch,
harassment, hatred, and other improper bases. Instead, before a search may
be undertaken or a seizure effected, the state actor involved (most often a
police officer) must have either a judicially issued warrant or a particular
quantum of belief or suspicion.2
Though the Supreme Court has woven an impressive and reasonably
comprehensive fabric of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 3 it has never
resolved the constitutionality of pretextual Fourth Amendment actions. For
the purposes of this Comment, pretextual conduct is that in which a police
1 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 The causal bases which police must have in order to carry out a search or
seizure are probable cause and reasonable suspicion. For purposes of this Comment,
the following definition of probable cause (the strictest Fourth Amendment standard) is
sufficient: "A reasonable ground for belief in certain alleged facts. A set of
probabilities grounded in the factual and practical considerations which govern the
decisions of reasonable and prudent persons and is more than mere suspicion but less
than the quantum of evidence required for conviction." BLAcK's LAW DiCrIoNARY
1201 (6th ed. 1990). For a definition of reasonable suspicion, the intermediate causal
basis, see infra note 11. In a third category (with the lowest level of scrutiny) are
searches and seizures that need only be effected pursuant to a standard of general
reasonableness. See, e.g., cases discussed infra note 145.
3 Note that this is not a view that is universally shared. See, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994).
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officer makes a stop, arrest, or search, based on a constitutionally proper
level of belief or suspicion with respect to offense A, when he or she is in
fact interested in the individual's possible connection to a separate offense
B, for which he or she lacks a constitutionally acceptable level of belief or
suspicion.4
It appeared in 1985 that the Supreme Court would finally resolve the
pretext question, when certiorari was granted in State v. Blair.5 However,
after hearing oral arguments in the case, the Supreme Court dismissed the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 6
That unexplained move has left federal and state courts to continue to
develop their own pretext rules. Even before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit handed down its decision in United States v. Ferguson7 in
November of 1993, there was a split among the federal circuit courts as to
4 Compare the definition used by the district court in United States v. Ferguson
and restated by the Sixth Circuit: "[A] pretextual stop occurs when the police use a
legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person or place in connection
with an unrelated crime as to which they lack reasonable suspicion." United States v.
Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Accord United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988).
In Guzman, the court noted:
A pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the
stop in order to search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion
necessary to support a stop. The classic example, presented in this case, occurs
when an officer stops a driver for a minor traffic violation in order to investigate a
hunch that the driver is engaged in illegal drug activity.
Id.
5 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Missouri v.
Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 480 U.S. 698
(1987).
6 Missouri v. Blair, 480 U.S. 698 (1987). The certiorari dismissal was made
without comment, leaving scholars to speculate on the Court's reason(s) for doing so.
One author has suggested that the Court did so because "the Missouri trial court made
a factual finding that the defendant was not arrested for the traffic violation, but was
illegally detained as part of a homicide investigation. Thus, without an arrest, the
Court could not reach the pretext issue." See Daniel S. Jonas, Comment, Pretext
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1791, 1791 n.4 (1989) (citation omitted).
7 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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the test by which allegedly pretextual police conduct should be measured.8
The Ferguson decision enacts yet a third test, adding further confusion and
inconsistency to the area.
What makes the Supreme Court's silence on the pretext question so
unusual is the extraordinary potential for the intrusive and arbitrary police
action that has long been the axis around which Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has revolved. If the police are allowed to take action against
citizens on a mere pretext, then they can effectively make an end-run
around the carefully crafted framework of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion9 that the Supreme Court has constructed. Particularly in the
motor-vehicle context, the myriad of petty offenses codified10 and so
available to police for use as a pretext means that virtually anyone can be
subjected to the indignity and fear of an encounter with police investigating
a serious crime based on nothing more than a police hunch and a failure to
signal when changing lanes.
This Comment begins by examining the pretext test adopted by the
Sixth Circuit in Ferguson and noting how it differs from the tests used by
other circuits. It then reviews the trio of Supreme Court cases that has
served as the basis for the Ferguson decision and the other circuits' pretext
rules. This Comment argues that the Ferguson court, as well as all but two
of the other circuits, have misunderstood the doctrinal direction of the
Supreme Court's pretext jurisprudence, and that the dangers of pretextual
police conduct demand a much firmer response than that employed by the
Sixth Circuit in Ferguson. The Comment concludes by arguing that the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have identified the proper objective
constitutional test for pretextual police action: that the Fourth Amendment
prohibition of unreasonable seizures is violated if the police would not have
stopped a car for a motor-vehicle violation absent an intuition, not
supported by facts amounting to the constitutionally required reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, that the individual stopped is involved in some
sort of other, more serious criminal wrongdoing.
8 The split that existed prior to the Ferguson decision was between the "would"
and "could" tests, which are discussed in Part MI.A of this Comment. The Ferguson
test is discussed in detail infra at Part ll.B.
9 See supra note 2 for definitions of these terms.
10 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.25, 4511.33 (Baldwin 1993)
(remaining within lane markings); id. § 4511.34 (space between moving vehicles); id.
§ 4511.39 (use of turn signals when changing lanes); id. § 4511.43 (coming to a
complete stop at "Stop" signs); id. § 4511.70 (maintaining clear rear and side rear
windows); id. § 4513.05 (maintenance of rear license plate bulbs).
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Though the pretext problem presents itself in a variety of Fourth
Amendment contexts, including pretext searches and pretext arrests, this
Comment focuses principally on the problems presented by pretextual stops
of motor vehicles under Terry v. Ohio.1I
II. TREATMENT OF PRETEXT POLICE ACTION BY THE
FEDERAL CIRCurr COURTS
The question of when a police officer can constitutionally stop a
motorist has sparked a sharp division between the federal circuit courts.
All but two of the circuits which have weighed the issue have determined
that a Terry-style investigative stop of a motor vehicle satisfies the Fourth
Amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures if the officer could
have stopped the vehicle for a traffic infraction. As such, this test places
only a minimal limit on police discretion: the jurisdiction's motor vehicle
operation statute, usually a highly detailed regulatory code that, if enforced
rigidly, would eventually snare even the most punctilious, perfectionist
driver. The officer's subjective motivation is ignored, as is the possibility
that the stop was made based on discriminatory animus.
The "would" test, by contrast, establishes a modest judicial check on
police, by imposing a "believability" standard: While an officer may
profess to have been concerned for traffic safety, do the circumstances, or,
for example, local citation-writing statistics, suggest that the stop would
not have taken place if the driver were not in an unusual place at an
unusual time, or of the wrong racial or ethnic background, or already
under observation for some much graver offense? The "would" test also
proclaims, at least by implication, that the motor vehicle statutes should
not be the means to the end of, say, narcotics law enforcement, but an end
in themselves. Such a measure does not require the court to endlessly
11 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The defendant in Terry was stopped (along with two
accomplices) and frisked by a plainclothes police officer who had observed a series of
unusual actions that led him to suspect that the trio was planning a robbery of a
particular store. Id. at 5-7. The Supreme Court sustained as constitutional the brief,
investigative, on-the-street stop for questioning and a subsequent frisk for weapons
despite the absence of probable cause for the seizure and search. Id. at 30-31. The
Terry standard, which has come to be known as the "reasonable suspicion"
requirement, was applied for the first time in the motor-vehicle context in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975): "[W]e hold that when an officer's
observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
[illegal aliens], he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that
provoke suspicion." Id. at 881.
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probe the minds of police officers, or act as a "Monday morning
quarterback," but rather provides an objective standard by which to check
police conduct that takes place at the outer reaches of credibility.
A. The Pretext Doctrine of the Federal Circuit Courts Other than the
Sixth Circuit
1. The "Could" Test
a. The Seventh Circuit's Approach
United States v. Trigg12 presents perhaps the most thorough and
scholarly treatment of the pretext question at the federal circuit court level.
In that case, a team of narcotics officers of the Allen County, Indiana,
police force began surveillance of an automobile that had earlier been
observed in front of a known crack house.13 Though it was
"undisputed... that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that
Trigg was engaged in narcotics activity," 14 the police following Trigg's car
stopped it once a headquarters records check uncovered that Trigg's license
had been suspended; the stop led to an arrest on the traffic charge,
followed by a search that revealed fifty-three grams of cocaine in Trigg's
coat pocket.15 The Seventh Circuit ignored an extraordinary show of force
by the Allen County police and the possible subjective motivations of the
officers, 16 and distilled the test for pretextual conduct to a simple
"objective" application of the probable cause requirement to the traffic
offense: "[S]o long as the police are doing no more than they are legally
permitted and objectively authorized to do, an arrest is constitutional." 17
That Trigg's earlier appearance at the crack house may have been the
12 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991).
13 Id. at 1038.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 The district court, alarmed by the unusual scene of six narcotics officers
teaming up to make an arrest on a minor traffic offense, had ruled that the traffic
arrest was just a pretext to search for drugs, which it found to be prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
17 Id. at 1041. Note that while the Seventh Circuit considers this a pretextual
arrest case, even though it began with a traffic stop, its holding is nonetheless useful
as an example of the "could" test.
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primary-subjective-motivation of the arresting officers was deemed
inconsequential by the Seventh Circuit.18
b. The Fifth Circuit's Approach
Among the cases cited in Trigg was United States v. Causey,19 a
pretext arrest case handed down by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc. Acting
on an anonymous tip about a bank robbery suspect, a tip which by their
own admission fell short of the probable cause required to make an arrest,
the police unearthed and executed a years-old misdemeanor arrest warrant
for failure to appear in court. 20 The court's language in rejecting a
subjective intent approach to the police conduct was very similar to that of
the Trigg court: "The correct rule is that . . in a case where the officers
have taken no action except what the law objectively allows their subjective
motives in doing so are not even relevant to the suppression
inquiry.... [T]he intent with which they acted is of no consequence." 21
c. The Eighth Circuit's Approach
The Eighth Circuit cited approvingly to both Trigg and Causey in its
opinion in United States v. Cummins,22 a case that involved exactly the sort
of traffic stop at issue in Ferguson.23 While acknowledging that a prior
decision of the Circuit "ha[d] declared in dictum 'that pretextual stops are
unreasonable under the fourth amendment,'" 24 the Cummins court
nonetheless adopted the "could" test for pretextual activity, holding that
"the stop remains valid even if the officer would have ignored the traffic
18 See id. at 1040 ("Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, cast substantial
doubt upon the continuing validity of the subjective intent approach. In a trilogy of
cases, the Court has stressed that fourth amendment analysis ordinarily involves 'an
objective assessment of the officer's actions ..... "). This trilogy is discussed in detail
infra at Part I, and criticized infra at Part IV.
19 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
20 Id. at 1180. At the trial, one of the officers acknowledged that the police had
no interest in the old nonappearance charge; their exclusive interest was Causey's
possible involvement in the bank heist, an interest fulfilled when Causey subsequently
confessed. Id.
21 Id. at 1184-85.
22 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991).
23 United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
24 Cunmins, 920 F.2d at 501 (quoting United States v. Portwood, 857 F.2d 1221,
1223 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989)).
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violation but for his other suspicions [about the individual's possible
involvement in more serious criminal activity for which an adequate causal
basis is lacking]."25 As in Ferguson, the police officer in Cummins began
to follow the car because its occupants were behaving strangely. 26 The
officer stopped the car when the driver (Cummins) failed to signal when
making a right turn.27 Notably, the officer testified at the suppression
hearing 28 that he "probably would not have stopped [Cummins] for the
traffic violation if the defendants had not behaved so suspiciously." 29 This
testimony passed without comment from the court.
d. The Third Circuit's Approach
The Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Hawkins30 was cited
by the Sixth Circuit in Ferguson31 and has been cited by others as a case
enacting the "could" standard for judging pretextual police activity, though
Hawkins in fact avoided the pretext issue.32 But the panel's critical
comments about the "would" test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit,33
combined with its dictum that "the fact that a pretext was given [i.e., that
the police officer testified that he stopped the vehicle for a series of traffic
offenses] does not render invalid an otherwise constitutional search," 34
25 Id.; cf. id. ("We reject the argument... that the applicable test is 'not
whether the officer could validly have made the stop but whether under the same
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the
invalid purpose.'") (quoting the Eleventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Smith,
799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986)).
26 Cunmins, 920 F.2d at 499.
27 Id.
28 A suppression hearing is "[a] pretrial proceeding in criminal cases in which a
defendant seeks to prevent the introduction of evidence alleged to have been seized
illegally. The ruling of the court then prevails at the trial." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY
1440 (6th ed. 1990).
29 Cummins, 920 F.2d at 500.
30 811 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987).
31 United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
32 Because the court "agree[d] with the district court that there was sufficient
basis to raise a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car... were engaged in
the sale and purchase of narcotics," Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 213, it found it
"unnecessary... to consider whether the officers' observations of a traffic violation
would alone have justified the stop," id. at 213 n.4. This, of course, is exactly the
opposite of what the Sixth Circuit did.
33 See id. at 215.
34 Id.
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have led some-or at least the Sixth Circuit-to conclude that the Third
Circuit is aligned with the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits on the
pretext question. 35
e. The Approaches of the Second, D. C., and Fourth Circuits
The Second Circuit aligned itself with the other circuit courts adopting
the "could" standard in United States v. Scopo. 36 The police who stopped
Scopo's vehicle were already following him as part of an investigation into
an internecine Mafia conflict which had already claimed several lives. 37
Scopo's car was stopped for changing lanes without signalling, a stop that
ultimately led to the discovery of an illegal handgun. 38 Although the court
used "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" interchangeably, and
did not appear to distinguish between pretextual stops and pretextual
arrests, 39 the ultimate effect of its holding is unmistakably clear: a stop is
constitutional as long as the officer could have stopped the car for a traffic
violation.40
While the D.C. Circuit's United States v. Mitchell41 opinion does not
take notice of the distinction between the "could" and "would" tests of
pretextual conduct, it appears to come down on the side of the "could"
test.42 The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Hassan El 43 does
make mention of the "would/could" dichotomy, "adopt[ing] the objective
test and . . . hold[ing] that when an officer observes a traffic offense or
35 Note that the Fourth Circuit in 1992 heard a case challenging the
constitutionality of a purportedly pretextual stop. After reviewing both the "could"
and the "would" tests, United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875-76 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 351 (1992), however, the court concluded that "[alpplying
either test to the facts of this case would yield the same result, so we reserve the
choice between the two for another day," id. at 876.
36 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir. 1994).
37 Id. at 779.
38 Id. at 780.
39 See id. at 781-85.
40 See id. at 784. In fact, the Sixth Circuit's United States v. Ferguson decision is
the case most relied upon by the Scopo court. See id.
41 951 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1976 (1992).
42 See id. at 1295 (citing to the Eighth Circuit's United States v. Cwmins ruling
and commenting that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not bar the police from stopping
and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws").
43 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1347 (1994).
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other unlawful conduct, he or she is justified in stopping the vehicle under
the Fourth Amendment."44
2. The "Would" Test
Even before the Sixth Circuit's adoption of a third test for pretextual
police activity in United States v. Ferguson,45 the federal circuit courts
were already split over the proper method for evaluating claims of pretext,
and had been so split since the Eleventh Circuit's 1986 ruling in United
States v. Smith.46
According to the testimony of the Florida Highway Patrol officer who
made the stop challenged in Smith, he began following Smith's car because
its occupants fit a drug-courier profile.47 The officer testified that the
driver appeared to be "weaving," 48 though the Eleventh Circuit seemed
skeptical of the trooper's veracity, observing that the car drifted outside its
lane only once, and then by a mere six inches. 49 The officer, believing he
had the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop for
drug trafficking, pulled the car over and, eventually, discovered a kilo of
cocaine. 50 The Eleventh Circuit first tested the officer's claim that the
defendants matched his drug-courier profile, concluding that the officer's
observations fell short of providing reasonable suspicion of drug
trafficking. 51 Moving on to the question of whether the driver's "weaving"
might have provided adequate justification for the stop, the court
articulated the test for pretextual conduct in a way that put it squarely at
odds with the several circuits that would later adopt the "could" test:
44 Id. at 730. The opinion explicitly eschews the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits'
"would" test. See id. at 729-3 1.
45 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
46 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
47 Id. at 705-06. The factors which made up the officer's drug-courier profile
apparently included the following: that the vehicle was traveling northbound on
Interstate 95 at 50 miles per hour at 3:00 a.m., that it was occupied by two men in
their 30s, that the vehicle bore out-of-state plates, that the driver was operating in an
"overly cautious" manner, and that the driver did not look toward the police cruiser,
which was apparently clearly visible in the median. Id. at 706.
48 Id. at 706.
49 Id. at 709.
50 Id. at 706.
51 Id. at 707.
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We conclude . . . that in determining when an investigatory stop is
unreasonably pretextual, the proper inquiry... is not whether the officer
could validly have made the stop but whether under the same
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the
absence of the invalid purpose. 52
Applying that test to the alleged weaving by Smith and his cohort, the
court concluded that "a reasonable officer would not have stopped the
appellants without an invalid purpose to obtain evidence of additional
criminal activity . . . .53
The Tenth Circuit is the only federal appeals court to have adopted the
Eleventh Circuit's "would" test. The court did so in United States v.
Guzman54 by quoting directly from the holding of Smith.55 The court sent
the case back to the trial court to apply the test,56 noting along the way that
the trial court had found the driver's failure to wear a seat belt was
"merely a pretextual justification for an otherwise unconstitutional stop on
suspicion of drug possession. "57
B. The Sixth Circuit and United States v. Ferguson-The "Could-
Plus" Test
Cecil Ferguson's trouble began when Memphis, Tennessee, police
officer Ernie Writesman stopped by for a "routine check" of the Royal
Oaks Motel early on the morning of October 18, 1990.5 8 A series of
52 Id. at 709.
53 Id. at 708.
54 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). The Tenth Circuit recently reaffirmed its
fidelity to Guzman in United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994); the
decision provoked a vigorous dissent by Senior District Judge Wesley E. Brown, who
was sitting by designation. See id. at 883-90.
55 See Guznan, 864 F.2d at 1517.
[We believe the Eleventh Circuit has established the better test for determining
whether an investigatory stop is unconstitutional: a court should ask "not whether
the officer could validly have made the stop, but whether under the same
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the
invalid purpose."
Id. (quoting Smith, 799 F.2d at 709).
56 Id. at 1521.
5 7 Id. at 1515.
58 United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 386 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
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unusual actions by Ferguson and an associate aroused Writesman's
suspicions, and so he followed the pair when they left the motel in the car
of Ferguson's associate.5 9 Writesman pulled the vehicle over once he
noticed that it lacked a visible license plate, a violation of a municipal
traffic ordinance. 60 Though the stop was for the traffic offense, the officer
testified that his "'number one' reason" for stopping the duo was their
suspicious activity back at the motel. 61 The stop led to a series of events,
not challenged in the case on appeal, that culminated in the arrest and
conviction of Ferguson for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
as well as carrying a firearm in connection with a drug crime.62
The Sixth Circuit was obviously itching to reverse course on its own
pretext doctrine when it later decided United States v. Ferguson.63 In the
first place, the en banc decision marked a reversal of the decision made in
the same case by a panel of its own court. 64 Even more significantly, the
court could have decided the case and reached the same result-sustaining
Ferguson's convictions for drug trafficking and firearm possession-
without reaching the pretext issue. In an unusual move-carried out in a
footnote-the court acknowledged that the police might have had
reasonable suspicion to stop Ferguson and his accomplice for the offense in
which they (the police) were subjectively interested. 65 Rather than using
the more settled law of the reasonable suspicion standard, however, the
59 Id. at 386-87.
60 Id. at 387. In fact the car's license plate was resting in plain view on the rear
dash. Id. It is not clear from the opinion if the officer took notice of such fact.
61 Id.
62 See id. Ferguson was convicted at trial; the district court's most notable finding
(for the purposes of this Comment) was that "the activities observed by the officer at
the motel were enough to support a stop and detention based on reasonable suspicion."
Id. (For a definition of reasonable suspicion, see supra note 2.) At the same time, thi
trial court concluded that the officer's stop, whether it was based in whole or in part
on the traffic violation, was not unconstitutionally pretextual. Id.
63 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
64 See id. (noting that the en bane court was vacating the panel decision). For the
panel decision which was vacated, see United States v. Ferguson, 989 F.2d 357 (6th
Cir. 1993) (majority opinion by Circuit Judges Keith and Jones). The first three-judge
panel adopted the Eleventh Circuit's "would" test, discussed supra at Part ll.A.2.
65 Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 387-88 n.1 ("We need not address the district court's
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to support the stop based on his
observances at the motel, because... we conclude that [the police officer] had
probable cause to stop the vehicle based on the license plate violation.").
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court distinguished its pretext precedent, which had pointed toward
Ferguson's release, and issued a new rule.66
The Ferguson court began its legal analysis by observing that "[tihis
Circuit has repeatedly maintained that the test to be utilized in determining
whether a stop is pretextual is the [Eleventh Circuit's] 'would'
test ..... 67 Within a matter of pages, however, the Sixth Circuit
distinguished its various cases that had relied upon the "would" test,68 and
abandoned it in favor of its own version of the "could" test. 69 The full
court held:
so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not unlawful and does
not violate the Fourth Amendment. We focus . . . on whether this
particular officer in fact had probable cause to believe that a traffic offense
had occurred, regardless of whether his was the only basis or merely one
basis for the stop .... [I]t is irrelevant what else the officer knew or
suspected about the traffic violator at the time of the stop. It is also
irrelevant whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine
according to the general practice of the police department or the particular
officer making the stop. 70
Although this test is functionally quite similar to the "could" test
favored by most federal circuit courts, the Sixth Circuit made clear that its
was yet a third standard by which to measure allegedly pretextual
66 See id. at 390-91.
67 Id. at 389. The "would" test is discussed in detail supra at Part II.A.2.
68 See id. The cases so distinguished (in order of their discussion in the Ferguson
opinion) include United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1988), amended to add
concurrence, 866 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1090 (1990);
United States v. Crotinger, 928 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dunson,
940 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1488 (1992); United States v.
French, 974 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1012 (1993).
69 See Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391. Note that the majority and dissent cannot agree
on whether the holding in Ferguson is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's earlier
pretext cases, identified at supra note 68, or a reversal of the rule allegedly adopted
and applied in those cases. Compare id. at 392 ("By adopting this standard, we make
explicit that which was simply an inference under our prior cases .... ") (majority
opinion) with id. at 396 ("[The Court [the Sixth Circuit] overrules well established
precedent in this Circuit.") (Keith, J., dissenting). This author shares the view of the
dissent that the majority's opinion represents a change of course; in any case, the
resolution of this particular question is not important to the overall analysis of this
Comment. The "could" test is discussed supra at Part II.A. 1.
70 Id. at 391 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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conduct. 71 The court explained the difference between the ordinary "could"
test and its own formulation, which will be referred to throughout this
Comment as the "could-plus" test, by highlighting what it saw as the
potential flaw in the tests of those courts following the ordinary "could"
test:
As for the "could" test .... no circuit adopting that test has expressly
said that a stop can be justified merely by an after-the-stop determination
that the officer theoretically could have stopped the car for a traffic
violation, although he did not notice at the time of the stop that a violation
had. occurred. However, in our view, some of the language utilized by the
courts that subscribe to the "could" test is sufficiently imprecise to leave it
susceptible of such a reading. 72
Il. THE ROLE OF SCOTT V. UNITED STATES AND ITS PROGENY
IN THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE
Though they take inconsistent approaches to pretextual police activity,
all of the courts whose rules are reviewed in Part II share one critical
common feature: They each consider the test enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Scott v. United States,73 and reiterated in the subsequent cases of
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez74 and Maryland v. Macon,75 to be
dispositive of their approach to the pretext issue.76
71 See id. at 392 (implying that its holding represents a third standard by
commenting that "[w]e also will avoid some of the problems inherent in the 'would'
and 'could' tests").
7 2 Id. at 391.
73 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
74 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
75 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
76 See, e.g., (in order of their treatment in Part I.A of this Comment) United
States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Recent Supreme Court
decisions ... cast substantial doubt upon the continuing validity of the subjective
intent approach. In a trilogy of cases, the Court has stressed that fourth amendment
analysis ordinarily involves 'an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.'") (citing Macon, Scott, and
Villamonte-Marquez; the quoted language within the Trigg quote is from Scott, 436
U.S. at 136), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d
1179, 1182-84 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (concluding after a review of the same three
cases that "the results of [police] investigations are not to be called in question on the
basis of any subjective intent with which [the police] acted"); United States v.
Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Scott, 436 U.S. at 136, for the
proposition that "the Court has told us in unmistakable terms that we are to make 'an
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The extensive emphasis placed upon Scott in the pretext context is
interesting, for in Scott the complaint about the police conduct had nothing
to do with pretext. The claimed police malfeasance in Scott was that while
conducting a judicially authorized wiretap of a suspected drug dealer's
phone line, the agents involved made no effort to comply with a federal
law that wiretapping "'be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception ..... -77 The agents listening in had intercepted and
monitored virtually every call, though only forty percent were drug-
related; 78 more importantly, the head of the investigation candidly admitted
that he and his team had made absolutely no effort to minimize their
interception of non-narcotics calls to the monitored line.79  The
government responded that "[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." 80 That argument held
the day. 81
The import of the Scott decision is that courts weighing compliance
with the Fourth Amendment should not undertake a subjective inquiry into
an officer's state of mind: "[1In evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth
Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to
objective assessment of the officer's actions,'" and Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71, for
the point that "'the officer's actual state of mind... ,... is of no significance in
determining whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred"), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 214 (3d Cir.
1987) ("The focus on objective factors [under the Fourth Amendment] rather than
subjective intent has been illustrated by a number of decisions discounting the
relevance of the officer's state of mind.") (successively discussing Scott, Macon, and
Villamonte-Marquez), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987); United States v. Smith, 799
F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting approvingly from Macon, 105 S. Ct. at 2783
(which quoted Scott, 436 U.S. at 136) that "'[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation
has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on the officer's actual
state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken'"); United States v. Guzman,
864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) ("This test properly preserves the Supreme
Court's requirement of an objective inquiry into Fourth Amendment activity .... ")
(citing Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71, and Scott, 436 U.S. at 137-38).
77 Scott, 436 U.S. at 130 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976)).
78 Id. at 132.
79 Id. at 133 n.7.
80 Id. at 136.




him."8 2 A similar, if more confusing, declaration of this principle was
made by the Court a page later: "Mhe fact that the officer does not have
the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the
action."83
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,8 4 the second and perhaps most
curious case in the Scott trilogy, appeared to present a pretext question, in
that customs officials and police officers following up on an informant's tip
about a drug shipment boarded a sailboat pursuant to a statute authorizing
such boarding at any time to check documentation. 85 The Court's only
reference to Scott came in a footnote, and exposed precious little of the
Court's thinking on the pretext issue:
Respondents... contend... that because the... officers ...were
following an informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought
to be carrying marihuana, they may not rely on the statute authorizing
boarding for inspection of the vessel's documentation. This line of
reasoning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott v. United States, and
we again reject it.86
Exactly what was meant by "this line of reasoning" is unclear, a fact
that will be explored in detail in a subsequent Part of this Comment.
Moreover, the pretext question was made seemingly irrelevant by the
Court's subsequent holding, which approved the suspicionless seizure of
vessels that have access to the open sea regardless of the officers'
subjective motives in stopping the vessel.8 7
Maryland v. Macon88 is the third case regularly cited for the
proposition that an officer's subjective intent should not be relevant to a
Fourth Amendment analysis. As in Scott, there was no pretext claim made
in Macon; indeed, the case was not even concerned with seizure of a
person, but instead reiterated the Scott rule in the context of a seizure of
82 Id.
83 Id. at 138.
84 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
85 See id. at 584 n.3.
86 Id. (citation omitted).
87 Id. at 593. The Court took pains to distinguish automotive law enforcement, in
which the police are subject to significant Fourth Amendment constraints, from
maritime law enforcement, in which the government's interests are much weightier.
Id. at 592-93.
88 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
property (obscene magazines). The respondent had argued to the Court that
because the officer who purchased the magazine (as part of a sting
operation) subjectively intended to retain the magazine and retrieve the bill
used to pay for the magazine upon arrest, the purchase was therefore a
warrantless seizure.8 9 The Court's response invoked Scott, noting that
"[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an
objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on the officer's actual
state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." 90 The Court
further observed that "[t]he sale is not retrospectively transformed into a
warrantless seizure by virtue of the officer's subjective intent to retrieve
the purchase money to use as evidence." 91
This trio of cases has played a central role in the reasoning of each
federal court that has considered the pretext stop question. Part IV of this
Comment demonstrates why these cases do not necessarily dictate the result
in United States v. Ferguson92 or in the several other cases implementing
the "could" test.
IV. ARE ScoTT, VLLAMONTE-MARQUEZ, AND MACON THE RIGHT
CASES BY WHICH TO DECIDE THE PRETEXT PROBLEM?
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Scott trilogy in the pretext
context is that circuits with entirely contradictory rules all point to the trio
as supporting their formulation of the standard by which to measure
pretextual police conduct. 93
This Part first argues that the Scott trilogy presents an exceptionally
thin foundation on which to balance the line of pretext precedent that
includes the decision in United States v. Ferguson.94 This Part goes on to
argue that pretextual police conduct should be viewed from the broader
context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Further, the dangers posed
by pretextual police conduct go to the heart of the concerns that led to the
adoption of the amendment originally, and which have informed some of
the most important cases in the development of the Fourth Amendment.
This section concludes by arguing that while the Sixth Circuit's decision in
89 Id. at 466.
90 Id. at 470-71 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978))
(citations omitted).
91 Id. at 471.
92 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
93 See supra note 76.
94 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
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Ferguson is an improvement over the other "could" test decisions on which
it was based, only the "would" test adopted by the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits presents a mode of analysis that is consistent with the history of
the Fourth Amendment.
Scott v. United States95 stated no more than what was already an
accepted fact of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: that courts should not
be in the business of quizzing police officers about what was going through
their minds when a particular action was taken.96 This principle receives
no quarrel from this author.
That subjective intent should be beyond judicial inquiry does not mean,
however, that courts should never second-guess police conduct for its
comportment with the underlying policies that inform the amendment; nor
that an officer's possible or likely motives are never material to the Fourth
Amendment inquiry.
The very nature of the Fourth Amendment is such that courts
continually review police conduct; the only question is how exacting that
scrutiny should be. This point was acknowledged, as it must be, by the
Scott Court itself, in its quotation from Terry v. Ohio:97
[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which... reasonably warrant that
intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful
only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral
scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making
that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an
objective standard; would the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that the action taken was appropriate?98
The point here is that while the officer's actual subjective motives in
making a search or seizure may be beyond judicial scrutiny, the
"objective" officer test-the "man of reasonable caution" hypothesized-is
95 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
96 Id. at 137 ("[A]Imost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the
Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him."); see also
supra note 76 (reviewing circuit court language on the disutility of weighing an
officer's subjective state of mind).
97 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry is discussed briefly supra at note 11.
98 Scott, 436 U.S. at 137 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22) (emphasis added).
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a means of ensuring compliance with a minimum standard that, in its
application, eliminates a great deal of police conduct tainted with
subjectively improper motives. The sentence that immediately follows the
above-quoted passage from Terry explains why: "Anything less would
invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has
consistently refused to sanction." 99 While the test may be an "objective"
one, the evil it is aimed at-the "hunch"-is most assuredly a creature of
the officer's subjective consciousness.
The several cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed its
concern with the "unconstrained discretion" 100 of police officers provide
perhaps the most instructive exposition of the Court's interest in the
subjective state of mind of police officers-albeit via an objective test.
When presented in Delaware v. Prouse°1 with a state policy of making
random stops of motorists to check their license and registration, the Court
insisted that, before doing so, the officer have an "articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is
not registered." 102 The Court supported the adoption of this objective
measure of the officer's conduct by pointing to the dangers of
"unconstrained discretion"-unequivocally a subjective concept: "This kind
of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has
discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the
official in the field be circumscribed . "..."103
The Court was similarly hesitant to cede the discretion to make stops
of automobiles to the police in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.104 In that
case, the Court found that the U.S. Border Patrol's policy of making
"roving-patrol stops" 105 of vehicles that contained persons of apparent
Mexican ancestry violated the Constitution unless the officer making the
99 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
100 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 663.
103 Id. at 661 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270
(1973), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)); see also id.
("The marginal contribution to roadway safety... cannot justify ... seizure... at
the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials."); id. at 662 (discussing "[t]he
'grave danger' of abuse of discretion") (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 559 (1976)).
104 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
105 Id. at 882.
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stop had facts that would "lead him reasonably to suspect" 106 that the
vehicle contained illegal aliens. As it had done in Prouse, the Court
centered its reasoning on the dangers posed by unfettered government
power, noting that "the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment demands something more than the broad and unlimited
discretion sought by the Government." 10 7 The Court expressed the fear
that "[t]o approve roving-patrol stops... without any
suspicion.., would subject the residents of these and other areas to
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at
the discretion of Border Patrol officers." 10 8 The significance of the Court's
concern with unobstructed police discretion in the Prouse and Brignoni-
Ponce cases was not lost by the Tenth Circuit, which made the following
observation in United States v. Guzman: "In situations where police
discretion to stop virtually anyone creates the potential for abuse . . . the
[Supreme] Court has held the practice unconstitutional without specific
inquiry into whether the police actually abused their discretion." 10 9
The more chilling and insidious danger inherent in permitting
pretextual stops was revealed in Brignoni-Ponce when the Court noted that
the "only reason [that the police made the challenged stop] was that its
three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent." 110 A concurring
opinion in the most recent pretextual stop case, United States v. Scopo,"'
pointedly warned that the "could" test's minimalistic review of police
activity might open the door to racist or classist law enforcement:
The risk inherent in such a practice [i.e., the "could" test] is that
some police officers will use the pretext of traffic violations or other
minor infractions to harass members of groups identified by factors that
are totally impermissible as a basis for law enforcement activity-factors
such as race or ethnic origin, or simply appearances that some police
officers do not like, such as young men with long hair, heavy jewelry, and
106 Id. at 881.
107 Id. at 882.
108 Id.
109 United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 691 (1979), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (emphasis added)).
110 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875. For a brief discussion of the pretextual
enforcement of traffic laws against prominent African-American entertainment and
sports figures in the Los Angeles area, see Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and
Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in
Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1453, 1476-78 (1993).
111 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir. 1994).
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flashy clothing. In upholding Scopo's arrest, we should not be understood
to be giving police officers carte blanche to skew their law enforcement
activity against any group that displeases them. 112
The Ferguson "could-plus" test provides no protection against the
invidiously discriminatory enforcement of traffic laws, because the only
restriction on the police is that a traffic offense has actually been
committed. Indeed, the whole point of the "could" test is that the police
can stop someone whose appearance they do not like, as long as the vehicle
stopped has been involved in a bona fide traffic infraction.
Admittedly, the targets of such discriminatory enforcement of the
traffic laws could find sanctuary in the Equal Protection Clause, a
constitutional tort action, or perhaps various state statutory or
constitutional provisions. However, the Fourth Amendment has long been
the first place to look-before these other shields-for protection from
arbitrary police action.
Even a federal immigration law explicitly authorizing law enforcement
officers to stop and search anyone within 100 miles of the U.S.-Mexican
border1 13 cannot enable the police to avoid the Fourth Amendment's
concerns about discretionary activity. In voiding the drug conviction of a
man who was stopped and searched pursuant to this law despite a lack of
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, the Court in Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States1 14 took pains to emphasize that "[t]he search . . . was
conducted in the unfettered discretion of the members of the Border
Patrol .... The search thus embodied the evil the Court saw... when it
insisted that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be
circumscribed .... "115
South Dakota v. Opperman,116 the leading Supreme Court case on
automobile inventory searches, provides a similar clue that "objective"
constitutional tests should be designed to unearth improper subjective
motives. Implicit in the conclusion that "inventories pursuant to standard
112 Id. at 785-86 (Newman, I., concurring). Judge Newman used the Fourteenth
Amendment to resolve the discriminatory enforcement problem, proclaiming that "the
Equal Protection Clause has sufficient vitality to curb most of the abuses .... " Id. at
786.
113 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1993); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (1994) (limiting
the search area to 100 miles from any border).
114 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
115 Id. at 270 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33
(1967)).
116 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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police procedures are reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment 117 is the
fear on the part of the Court that inventories conducted contrary to police
procedure are infected with an unacceptable quantity of subjective police
discretion. The Court in the same opinion hinted at this, observing that
"there is no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure... was a
pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." 118 Again, the
implication is that the absence of a standard procedure would provide
objective evidence of a pretextual motive-a subjective state of mind that,
while not declared unconstitutional, certainly seemed to trouble the Court.
Finally, consider Chimel v. California,119 which scaled back the scope
of the search of a building incident to an arrest from the entire building to
the limited area to which an arrestee might reach to obtain a weapon or
destroy evidence. 120 Although the Court declined to say whether the
petitioner's argument was "correct" with respect to his specific case, they
did acknowledge that the petitioner was correct in "point[ing] out that one
result of [the Supreme Court precedent which was limited by Chimel] is to
give law enforcement officials the opportunity to engage in searches not
justified by probable cause, by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest
suspects at home rather than elsewhere." 121 Though it retained an
objective, clear, easily applied rule-what is commonly known as the
lunging reach of the arrestee-the purpose of the Supreme Court's
retrenchment was to limit the exercise by police of subjective bad faith-
timing an arrest for a moment when the target of the arrest would be at
home.
Scott v. United States,122 for all its emphasis on an objective test, is
devoid of any clue that the Court's historical distaste for "hunch" police
activity-that which cedes too much discretion to officers-should no
longer be relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Most importantly,
the police in Scott were not acting pursuant to a hunch; in fact, they were
operating under a judicial finding of probable cause, 123 the statutory
prerequisite for initiating the wiretap. In executing the wiretap, the police
were likewise not acting pursuant to a hunch. Although most of the
117 Id. at 372.
118 Id. at 376.
119 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
120 See id. at 766-68.
121 Id. at 767.
122 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
123 Id. at 131.
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majority opinion in Scott discusses the statutory issues' 24 raised by the
case, that analysis appears to clear the officers monitoring the phone line of
exercising excessive discretion. Dismissing "blind reliance on the
percentage of nonpertinent calls intercepted," 125 the Court commented that
with most calls, "agents can hardly be expected to know that the calls are
not pertinent prior to their termination."126 An even more strongly worded
absolution seemed to concede the impossibility of compliance with the
minimization provisions of the statute: "[E]ven a seasoned listener would
have been hard pressed to determine with any precision the relevancy of
many of the calls before they were completed." 127
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,128 the second case in the Scott
trilogy, is an oddity, for it appears to provide few, if any restrictions on
the power of customs officials to make random and suspicionless stops of
boats with access to the open sea. But while the case in effect permits
"hunch" police activity, at the same time it carefully limits that
discretionary activity to waterborne vessels:
124 The main statutory issue in the case was the requirement that the interception
of calls unrelated to narcotics trafficking be minimized. See supra notes 77-81 and
accompanying text.
125 Scott, 436 U.S. at 140.
126 Id. In the very next sentence the Court went on to explain that "when the
investigation is focusing on... a widespread conspiracy more extensive surveillance
may be justified in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the enterprise." Id.
127 Id. at 142. The Court also noted that many of the calls were ambiguous or
one-time conversations, and that they "did not give the agents an opportunity to
develop a category of innocent calls which should not have been intercepted .... " Id.
The fact that Scott (and Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985), as well,
discussed infra at notes 135-38 and accompanying text) did not involve a
"hunch"/discretion problem was not lost on the Tenth Circuit panel deciding United
States v. Guzman, one of the two federal circuit court cases applying the "would" test:
We note that the decisions in Scott v. United States and Maryland v. Macon, often
cited in the pretext context, did not emphasize the arbitrariness problem because it
was not before the Court. No Fourth Amendment intrusion occurred in Macon,
and the officers in Scott had a warrant. Thus, neither case involved a defendant
whose Fourth Amendment rights were subject to the "discretion of the official in
the field."
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 n.3 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted) (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973)).
128 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
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Random stops without any articulable suspicion of vehicles away from the
border are not permissible under the Fourth Amendment, but stops at
fixed checkpoints are. The nature of waterborne commerce in waters
providing ready access to the open sea is sufficiently different from the
nature of vehicular traffic on highways as to make possible alternatives to
the sort of 'stop' made in this case less likely to accomplish the obviously
essential governmental purposes involved. 129
The Court in Villamonte-Marquez cited twice to United States v.
Ramsey, 13 0 the case which definitively held that random and suspicionless
searches at the U.S. border are constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 13 1 Although these citations are not necessarily used to support
Villamonte-Marquez as a border-search case, 132 it nonetheless seems clear
that the Court in Villamonte-Marquez viewed the case that way. The most
significant evidence on this point is the Court's explanation of why it
granted certiorari: "Because of a conflict among the Circuits and the
importance of the question presented as it affects the enforcement of
129 Id. at 592-93 (citations omitted). Although the border search rule itself was
not invoked in the opinion, among the "obviously essential government purposes"
discussed in the opinion was the need to prevent the smuggling of aliens and
contraband, thus suggesting an analogy to the border search rule, which authorizes
random and suspicionless searches. Id. at 591. Note that the Court in Villamonte-
Marquez specifically dismissed the permanent checkpoint approach of United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), in which the stops were not random but were
suspicionless, for use on the nation's waters: "[N]o reasonable claim can be that
permanent checkpoints would be practical on waters such as these .... " Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. at 589. This author reads this language to say that random and
suspicionless stops on certain bodies of water are acceptable.
130 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
131 Id. at 616 ("That searches made at the border ... are reasonable simply by
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended
demonstration."); see also id. at 619 ("Border searches, then, from before the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be 'reasonable' by the
single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from
outside.").
132The two citations to Ramsey in Villamonte-Marquez can be found at
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 585-86 (supporting the declaration that
"we... agree with the Government's contention that the enactment of this statute by
the same Congress that promulgated the constitutional Amendments that ultimately
became the Bill of Rights gives the statute an impressive historical pedigree"); and id.
at 591 (citing Ramrey for the proposition that the government's interest in controlling
imports of contraband "are... most substantial in areas such as the ship channel in
this case").
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customs laws, we granted certiorari." 133 Despite Villamonte-Marquez's
cryptic reaffirmation of Scott's language on ignoring an officer's subjective
intent, 134 it hardly seems appropriate to use a case that imposes no
subjective nor objective limitations at all on law enforcement officials
(except that the challenged act occurred on waters with access to the open
sea) to resolve the pretext question-which considers whether the test
should be subjective or objective and what quantum of evidence is
necessary to meet the test.
Maryland v. Macon,135 the third case in the Scott trilogy routinely
cited by the circuit courts fashioning pretext rules, is perhaps the least
helpful of the three cases. Whereas in Scott and Villamonte-Marquez the
Court decided whether a police action that was a search or seizure was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court in Macon invoked
Scott's "objective" test 136 and determined that no search or seizure had
taken place.137 The Macon Court never reached the question of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 138 The pretext problem, by
contrast, is concerned with the reasonableness of a search or seizure that
has unquestionably taken place.
V. THE "WOULD" TEST: THE PROPER MEASURE OF
PRETEXTUAL ACTIVITY
Part IV of this Comment established that the Supreme Court has long
been interested in the subjective motives of police officers, albeit by
objective means of measurement. Part IV also urged that the doctrine
133 Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584; cf id. at 589 (noting that a roadblock
approach to intercepting waterborne smugglers would not be appropriate in "waters
providing ready access to the seaward border").
134 See id. at 584 n.3; supra text accompanying note 86.
135 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
136 Id. at 470-71 ("Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns
on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on the officer's actual state of
mind . . . .") (citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136
(1978)).
137 See id. at 469 ("The officer's action.., did not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment .... Nor was the.., purchase a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.") (citation omitted).
138 Id. at 471 ("Objectively viewed, the transaction was a sale in the ordinary
course of business. The sale is not retrospectively transformed into a warrantless
seizure by virtue of the officer's subjective intent .... ").
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allegedly initiated in Scott v. United States139 is an inappropriate window
through which to look for the Supreme Court's thinking on the pretext
problem; and that the Supreme Court has on several occasions expressed
wariness at the possibility of pretextual police activity. This Part argues
that the "would" pretext test in use by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits is a
more useful instrument for evaluating claims of pretext than the "could-
plus" test adopted in United States v. Ferguson140 or the "could" test on
which the Ferguson court improved. This Part also argues that the effect of
the "would" test, from the standpoint of the police eager to make stops
(and arrests), is quite modest.
The irony of the Sixth Circuit's Ferguson test is that, despite
eschewing a subjective inquiry into whether the officer had an improper
pretextual motive, the court prescribed a probe of the officer's state of
mind at the time he or she made the stop. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit
said that the inquiry into whether the officer had the requisite probable
cause to make a stop "will turn on what the officer knew at the time he
made the stop." 141
The danger of the "could" test, even with the Sixth Circuit's
modification to ensure that a stop is not "justified merely by an after-the-
stop determination that the officer theoretically could have stopped the car
for a traffic violation," 142 is that it facilitates a police end-run around the
probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards of the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For better or for worse, the Fourth
Amendment has always imposed a requirement that before interfering with
the privacy of a citizen, the police must have a certain quantum of belief or
suspicion that an individual has run afoul of the law. In the case of brief
stops of automobiles to question the occupants, that standard has always
been a reasonable suspicion that the occupants are involved in criminal
activity. 143 The "could" test, however, renders that requirement
inconsequential; an officer with a hunch that a driver has been or is
involved in criminal activity need only follow a vehicle until its operator
commits a technical violation of one of the innumerable traffic
ordinances. 144 It would be the exceptional driver indeed who could
maintain a course in perfect compliance with the motor vehicle laws. In
139 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
140 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
141 Id. at 391.
142 Id.
143 See supra note 11 (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873 (1975)).
144 See supra note 10.
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each of the three circumstances in which the Supreme Court has permitted
the police making a seizure to avoid the requirements of either probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, it has insisted that the seizure tactic be free
of the possibility of police discretion.' 45 In the pretextual stop context, by
contrast, the breadth of police discretion is practically unlimited. Of the
innumerable people who exceed the speed limit, change lanes without
signalling, or are momentarily distracted and cross over the lane stripings,
the police officer can subject to seizure the few who he or she has a
"hunch" are lawbreakers-despite lacking probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to support that hunch. 146
The "would" test employed by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits keeps
this gap in the Fourth Amendment closed, and at the same time minimizes
the prospect of "sending state and federal courts on an expedition into the
minds of police officers[, which] would produce a grave and fruitless
misallocation of judicial resources." 147 The Eleventh Circuit showed in
145 See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (per curiam)
(approving sobriety checkpoint so long as cars are stopped pursuant to a fixed
pattern); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (ordering a driver out of his
or her vehicle without any suspicion permissible if officer always does so); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding that seizure at a fixed
checkpoint permissible if all cars are halted).
146 This vision of objectionably selective police tactics has been noted by the
Eleventh Circuit: "With little more than an inarticulate 'hunch' of illegal activity an
officer could begin following a vehicle and then stop it for the slightest deviation from
a completely steady course." United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 711 (11th Cir.
1986). The Tenth Circuit has struck a similar note:
[A]n objective test that asks no more than whether some set of facts might justify a
given stop would permit arbitrary intrusions in situations such as traffic stops.
Under such a test, thousands of everyday citizens who violate minor traffic
regulations would be subject to unfettered police discretion as to whom to stop.
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988).
Finally, consider an earlier warning of this nature:
A holding that such a feeble reason [a traffic infraction] would justify a halting
and searching would mean that all travelers on the highway would hazard such
treatment, for who among them would not be guilty of crossing the center line so
much as a foot from time to time.
Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. 1953).
147 Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
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United States v. Smith148 precisely how courts can (and should) use an
objective test to uncover efforts by the police to make the sort of end-run
around the Fourth Amendment's protections that this Comment has argued
should not be permitted:
[W]hat turns this case is the overwhelming objective evidence that Vogel
had no interest in investigating possible drunk driving charges: he began
pursuit before he observed any "weaving" and, even after he stopped the
car, he made no investigation of the possibility of intoxication. That he
described the vehicle as being driven with an abundance of caution further
indicates that the stop was unrelated to any possible concern with traffic
safety. 149
The Tenth Circuit's explanation of how an objective test to detect a
subjective motive would work in practice is similarly straightforward. The
court's acknowledgment of the imperfection of their own test is particularly
noteworthy:
If police officers... are required to and/or do routinely stop most cars
they see in which the driver is not wearing a seat belt [the pretextual
reason for the stop in the case], then this stop was not unconstitutionally
pretextual at its inception, even if [the officer] subjectively hoped to
discover contraband during the stop. Conversely, if officers rarely stop
seat belt law violators absent some other reason to stop the car, the
objective facts involved.., suggest that the stop would not have been
made but for a suspicion that could not constitutionally justify the stop. 150
The notion that the "would" test makes the difficult task of police work
still more arduous is a red herring. While the "could-plus" test and the
traditional "could" test certainly make law enforcement easier, they do so
at the expense of Fourth Amendment freedoms, by facilitating an end-run
around the traditional requirements of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion. The "would" test, however, does not make law enforcement any
harder than the existing structure of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
already makes it. The only obstacle that is created by such a test is an
obstacle to those looking for a short-cut when, as best as can be determined
from objective evidence, they know they lack an adequate causal basis to
make a seizure or search. Remember that the police officer with mixed
motives will be able to "profit" from a traffic stop in which he or she had
148 799 F.2d 704 (1lth Cir. 1986).
149 Id. at 710-11 (emphasis added).
150 Guvzn, 864 F.2d at 1518 (footnote and citation omitted).
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some hunch that the individual stopped was involved in a more serious
crime-if the stop is one he or she would have made in any event. 151
Traffic enforcement, meanwhile, will not be affected at all, since the
pretext question is concerned only with what follows the traffic stop, not
the stop itself.152
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Ferguson153 went out of its way
to roll back the citizen's Fourth Amendment protection against pretextual
police stops. The decision, which enables the police to act on their hunches
in stopping motorists as long as the subject of their gut instincts has
committed some minor traffic offense, is a modest improvement over the
"could" test of pretextual conduct. Like every other pretextual stop case
decided by the federal circuit courts of appeal, the Ferguson decision is
premised on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. United States'54
and its progeny, which collectively are cited for the proposition that Fourth
Amendment police activity is to be scrutinized under an objective test. The
Scott doctrine, however, provides only a part of the answer to the pretext
problem. A broader review of Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that
the Court has long been concerned with the unconstrained discretion of law
enforcement officials, and that its many "objective" Fourth Amendment
tests-Scott included-have consistently had as their aim the prevention of
subjectively improper police action.
The Ferguson decision facilitates an end-rn around the framework of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause that has historically acted as a
shield against arbitrary police action. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits'
151 Though no case on this specific issue has been reported, the point here can be
elucidated by the following illustration: Presumably under the "would" test, an officer
observing a suspicious-looking vehicle could constitutionally stop the car once he or
she observed an egregious traffic violation for which he or she would make a stop in
any case-for example, running a red light or traveling at 30 miles per hour over the
speed limit. (This author is assuming (indeed hoping) that police regularly stop such
drivers.)
152 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged this very point in United States v. Guzman
when it held that "[aio prosecution for violation of a traffic regulation will be affected.
Police officers may always issue appropriate citations to drivers who violate traffic
regulations. Only evidence of a more serious crime discovered pursuant to such a stop
will be excluded if the stop was unconstitutionally pretextual." Guzman, 864 F.2d at
1518.
153 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
154 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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"would" test, meanwhile, meets the Supreme Court's requirement,
articulated in Scott v. United States,155 that the Fourth Amendment inquiry
not be a subjective one. More importantly, the "would" test is consistent
with the Court's long-time abhorrence of wide police discretion. Finally,
such a test would not make law enforcement any more difficult than the
requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion already do.
Indeed, it would simply preserve that constitutional edifice intact.
155 Id.
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